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In the context of emission trading it seems to be taken as given that people's preferences can be
ignored with respect to the whole process of fixing emission targets and allocating emission
permits to polluters. With this paper we want to reopen the debate on how citizens can be
involved in this process.
We try to show how citizen preferences can be included in the process of pollution control
through emission trading. We propose an emission trading system where all emission permits
are initially allocated to households who are then allowed to sell them in the permit market or
to withhold (at least some of) them in order to reduce total pollution. This proposal tries to
overcome the fundamental disadvantage of traditional permit systems which neglect consumer
preferences by solely distributing emission permits to producers / polluters. In our system the
property right to nature is re-allocated to the households who obtain the opportunity of
reducing actual emissions according to their personal preferences by withholding a part or all
of the emission permits allotted to them. Such a change in environmental policy would mark a
return to the traditional principles of consumer sovereignty by involving households (at least
partially) in the social abatement decision process instead of excluding them. Another
advantage of admitting households to the TEP market as sellers or buyers of permits is that
this increases the number of agents in the permit market and thus significantly reduces the
possibilities of strategic market manipulations.
We are grateful to Ulrike Lehr and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and
suggestions.
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1. Introduction
During the last years the popularity of emission trading as an instrument of environmental
policy has increased significantly. In particular, since the Climate Change Summit in Kyoto in
December 1997 where several countries agreed on concrete emission reduction targets, many
proposals for the implementation of an international emission trading system have been
discussed among economists as well as politicians and the public at large1. It has become clear
that an international system of emission trading could be useful for the regulation of "global"
and uniformly dispersed greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide where the exact geographical
location of the emitting plants does not matter. On a smaller scale emission trading systems can
be used effectively for the regulation of pollutants with a regional impact, such as sulfur
dioxide.2 Also on a national level emission trading has been acknowledged as an alternative to
emission taxes.3
The basic features of most emission trading systems are the same. A central authority such as a
national government or an international assembly of national government representatives fixes
a quantitative overall emission target for the whole region in question (e. g. 20,000,000 t/year
of SO2) and then a corresponding number of emission permits is printed. The most challenging
task in this context is the distribution of the tradable emission permits (TEPs) to individual
polluters. There are two main allocation methods which are discussed in the economic
literature as well as among practicians of environmental policy: grandfathering and auctioning.
Grandfathering means that the permits are distributed without charge to the polluting firms
according to their past emissions. This implies that the property right to nature or to the
environment is allocated to the polluters (up to the overall emission limit, of course).
Auctioning of the TEPs on the other hand implies that the property right to nature lies with the
government.
It is astonishing to note that household preferences are completely ignored in this process,
regardless of whether the TEPs are auctioned or grandfathered. It seems that pollution control
is regarded as a business between firms on the one hand and government on the other. This
conflicts with the anthropocentric nature of economic theory where the justification for all
sorts of policy action is to be found in people's preferences. Why should we want to reduce
emissions if not for the sake of people's well-being? Therefore, it seems illogical to exclude
households from the whole process of defining pollution targets and allocating emission
permits. The neglect of people's preferences in practical environmental policy also contradicts
the principles of economic freedom as defined by William Hutt and his idea of consumer
sovereignty: "When I think of economic freedom, I think of a productive system commanded
by 'consumers' sovereignty'. This is a notion which ... indicates that ultimate power to
determine the use of resources which are 'scarce' ... shall be vested in the people. It implies that
the goodness or success of productive effort can be judged only in the light of consumers'
preferences."4 This seems to be justification enough to search for possibilities to involve
                                               
1 For an overview over the recent discussion see e. g. Schneider / Wagner (1998).
2 A well-known example of sulfur emission trading is the allowance trading concept following the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990 to reduce emissions contributing to acid rain (Acid Rain Program ARP) in the
U. S. (cf. for details 40 Code of Federal Regulations 73and for an evaluation Tietenberg (1998a) or Harrison
(1999)).
3 Cf. e. g. Tietenberg (1998b).
4  Hutt (1943, p. 215).- 3 -
households actively in the decision processes of climate policy. In this paper we propose an
emission trading system where households can at least partially influence the fixing of pollution
limits according to their preferences.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we give a short description of customary
emission trading systems based on auctioning or grandfathering. An alternative emission
trading mechanism which vests households with some influence on the determination of overall
pollution limits is proposed in section 3. In section 4 we explore the psychological background
which makes our system workable, and in section 5 we consider its efficiency properties. Some
concluding remarks are contained in section 6.
2. Emission trading
Global pollutants such as carbon dioxide can be controlled most effectively by internationally
coordinated measures. A rather popular instrument often called for in this context is an
international system of emission trading which was also proposed at the Climate Change
Summit at Kyoto in 1997. Such a system requires that an international board of national
government representatives comes to an understanding on a global emission target with respect
to the pollutant in question. Then, a corresponding number of emission permits can be printed.
As a second step the representatives of the national governments must agree on the mode of
distribution of these permits to the different countries. On a national level governments must
decide how to allocate the TEPs to the different polluters. The same task is incumbent on
government for merely national TEP systems. As mentioned above there are two main classes
of allocation systems for emission permits, auctioning and grandfathering, which will be briefly
reviewed in the following subsections.
Auctioning
The simplest method of allocating tradable emission permits to polluting firms is to auction
them. There are several different methods of auctioning TEPs which all have the same basic
features in common.5 Government offers all or a major part of the newly printed TEPs in the
market, and firms have to buy enough TEPs to secure their optimal scale of production (see
fig. 1). A firm's choice depends on the prices in input and output markets as well as on its
individual technology and, of course, on the TEP price. In the TEP market an equilibrium price
will emerge which equals the different firms' marginal abatement costs. By this mechanism the
marginal abatement costs will be equated over all firms so that overall abatement efficiency will
prevail in the economy under consideration. This is illustrated in the following simple model.
Let us consider an economy with J different firms which all produce a single composite





j is the vector [y1
j, y2
j,..., yM
j] of inputs and the scalar e
j denotes the emissions
of firm j. We postulate that f
 j is strictly monotonous and concave in y
j and e
j which implies that
the use of nature e
j (as a sink for emissions) is treated like a normal input. We assume
substitutability between emissions e
j and some "normal" inputs ym
j which are traded in factor
                                               
5 Cf. e. g. Cramton / Kerr (1998, p. 3 ff. or 1999, p. 263 ff.), Montero (2000) or Johnstone (1999). .- 4 -
markets (e. g. an increase in some capital input like air filters can compensate for a reduction of
emissions with output being constant). Firms have to buy emission permits for every emission
unit so that e
j equals the number of permits bought by firm j. The firm's profit maximization
problem can be described by
(1) ( ) max
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where Z
 j is the firm's production possibility set, p is the output price, q is the vector of input
prices and pe is the price of the emission permits. If we assume perfect competition in all
markets, prices are regarded as given by the firm. Solving (1) leads to the output supply
function (a), the firm's vector of demand functions for market inputs (b) and to its demand
function for emission permits (c):
(2) (a) ( ) e
Sj j p , q , p x x =
*
(b) ( ) e
Dj j p , q , p y y =
*
(c) ( ) e
Dj j p , q , p e e =
*
The sum of the individual demands for emission permits must equal the overall emission target
E  so that the TEP market equilibrium can be described by







It should be noted that from the profit maximization problem (1) we obtain the optimality
conditions
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j*] are the same for all firms j˛{1,2,...,J}. Together with the input rule
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this implies that there is overall production efficiency in the economy under consideration since
the marginal products of all production factors (including the input "nature") are the same for
all firms.6 This is the familiar result for an economy where environmental distortions are
regulated by a TEP system (or by a uniform per unit pollution tax).
                                               
6 In practice, optimality condition (4) is often not fulfilled because TEP markets are not perfect (cf. e. g.






-  fig. 1: Auctioning  -
It is obvious that by this way of organizing a TEP system the preferences of citizens are
completely excluded from the whole decision process. The property right to the environment is
allocated to the government who has total control over the use of the environment in this case.
It fixes the overall emission limit and it sells the "right to pollute" to the firms and, thereby,
increases its revenues.
One disadvantage of the auctioning of TEPs is often seen in the fact that it extracts liquidity
from firms and, therefore, means an additional financial burden to them. To avoid this problem
most practical attempts to implement an emission trading system used another distribution
scheme for the TEPs which is described in the following section.
Grandfathering
Grandfathering means that each polluter receives a certain quantity of free TEPs from the
government where this quantity is related to his past emissions.7 This implies that no additional
costs are incurred by firms from the introduction of a TEP system as long as they do not
increase their emissions past their historical level.8 If polluters reduce their emissions they can
sell the redundant TEPs to other firms that want to expand their activities or to newcomers
who want to enter the respective commodity market. If polluters want to increase their
                                               
7 For several possibilities of designing a grandfathering system see e. g.  Klaasen / Försund (1994) or
Ackerman (1999).
8 Of course, this is true in the literal sense only if firms receive permits for precisely the same quantity of
emissions as they produced before. If they obtain permits only in relation to their historical emissions the
above statement must be modified accordingly but it still holds in a qualitative sense.- 6 -
production and, thereby, increase their emissions they have to buy additional permits in the
TEP market.
The profit maximization problem of a firm j is changed as compared to (1) only by the fact that
the firm now obtains a quantity e
j of emission permits for free. If government grandfathers all
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If a firm's optimal level of emission e
j* is less than e
j it can sell the difference in the TEP
market at the TEP price pe. If it needs more than e
j permits it has to buy the difference in the
TEP market but it still saves emission costs to the amount of pee
j. Therefore, grandfathering is
like granting the firm a lump sum transfer of pee
j monetary units. This becomes obvious from
the firm's profit maximization problem for the grandfathering case




e , y , x
e e p qy px max
j j j j - + -
˛Z
with    [ ] ( ) { } Z
j j j j j j j j x y e f y e x = ‡ , , ,  .
If TEP markets are competitive each firm will, as in the case of auctioning, buy or sell emission
permits until its marginal abatement costs equal the TEP price. Therefore, perfect competition
on the TEP market (and, of course, in the input and output markets) leads to abatement
efficiency in the sense that marginal abatement costs are equated over all firms according to
(4). This means that grandfathering as well as auctioning of emission permits allows the fixed
emission target E  to be reached at minimum overall (social) abatement costs.
The economic and ecological disadvantages of grandfathering are well known: it means a
privilege for all firms that already exist at the moment when a TEP system is introduced while
it results in a kind of entrance barrier for new firms that want to enter the market for the first
time. Pre-existing firms do not have to pay for emissions up to their respective historical level
e
j and additional costs are incurred only by additional emissions. Newcomers on the other
hand have to pay for all their emissions from the start. Grandfathering is, as we saw above,
equivalent to a lump-sum subsidy for the pre-existing firms. The higher the historical emission
level of a firm the higher is its subsidy. This means, that firms have strong incentives to raise
their emissions before the new TEP system is introduced. If only few firms participate in the
TEP market they may also store the TEPs grandfathered to them even if they do not need them
in order to keep new firms from entering the market. Therefore, grandfathering is






-  fig. 2: Grandfathering  -
As with the auctioning case grandfathering does not take into account the preferences of
citizens. First, the overall emission target E  is fixed more or less arbitrarily by the government,
and then firms can decide on the basis of their individual profit maximization considerations to
what extent they abate pollution and to what extent they buy emission permits. Household
preferences are entirely disregarded in this process (see fig. 2). The property right to the
environment is transferred to polluting firms, i. e. at least to those firms which already exist
before the TEP system is introduced. They can use the environment as a sink for their own
emissions or they can sell the right to (ab)use the environment to other polluters and, thereby,
increase their profits.
3. Considering household preferences
As was shown in the preceding section and is, of course, known from the respective literature
both traditional methods of distributing emission permits to polluters, i. e. auctioning and
grandfathering, are efficient in the sense that they ensure the realization of an arbitrary
pollution target with minimum overall costs. This is, however, only a second-best solution
since it does not guarantee the attainment of an optimal degree of pollution as would a
Pigovian tax. From the discussion on the Pigovian tax it is well known that a first best
optimum cannot be attained under real world conditions because the information necessary for
the design of an appropriate environmental policy instrument like the Pigovian tax is not
available. Nevertheless, we do not think that this can be accepted as an excuse for the total
neglect of household preferences in environmental policy. As we saw above the overall- 8 -
emission target is fixed by national government alone or, in the case of an international
emission trading system, by an international board of government representatives. Emission
targets fixed by international political negotiations are not even approximately Pareto-optimal,
as Baumol and Oates (1971) suppose, since real world politicians cannot find out people's idea
of an appropriate upper limit for CO2 emissions in a single country and, typically, they are not
even interested in finding it out. This means that the seeming "efficiency" of emission trading is
a mere cost efficiency when the TEPs are auctioned or grandfathered.
It is hard to understand why citizens should be excluded from the property right to the
environment since their well-being is the only reason for performing environmental policy at
all, and they have to bear the costs of environmental protection in the form of reduced market
consumption. The importance of considering people's preferences for environmental quality is
broadly accepted in other policy fields. For example, it has become quite common to perform
cost-benefit analyses before financing environmental projects like the creation of a national
park or measures to improve water quality etc. It has also become customary to analyze
people's preferences for environmental goods in the context of damage assessment after
environmental accidents, especially in the United States.9 Therefore, it is surprising and not
consistent with the principles of consumer sovereignty that citizen preferences should not
matter for that part of environmental policy which is intended to reduce environmental
deterioration like emission trading. It is not enough, of course, to include citizens as
"producers", i. e. as polluters, into the emission trading mechanism since, as welfare theory
tells us, it is rather their "private side" or their role as consumers that should be the guideline
for public policy. Or, as William Hutt (1936 / 1990, p. 257) puts it: "In regarding the individual
as a consumer, we do not see him in his full relationship to society. He is usually also a
producer. But as a producer he is the servant of the community." And, somewhat below: "As a
'consumer', each directs. As a 'producer', each obeys." In the process of traditional emission
trading policy it is, as was shown above, just the other way round.
An alternative distribution mechanism for TEPs
In order to integrate citizens into the emission trading system we propose a policy which lies
between the ideal of a first-best Pigovian solution on the one hand and the total neglect of
human preferences as it is common in actual emission trading systems on the other. We suggest
that government after fixing the overall emission limit E  prints the corresponding number of
emission certificates and distributes them for free to the private households. If a household h˛
{1,2,...,H} obtains e
h TEPs the overall emission limit E equals the sum of the individual TEP
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9 As a consequence of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA) of 1980 it is possible for the government in the U. S. to sue any person or firm for compensation
that is deemed responsible for contaminating the environment. Since 1989 compensation is demanded not
only for lost use values but also for destroyed nonuse values of natural goods which means that
compensation payments after a deterioration of environmental quality are directly linked to people's
preferences (cf. e. g.  Portney 1994, p. 9).- 9 -
The individual allotments e
h can, of course, be different for different households h. Since
households can sell the permits and buy consumption goods from the returns from this sale the
assignment of e
h TEPs to a household h has the same impact on household utility as a lump-
sum payment. Therefore, the choice of the distribution mode for the TEPs can be viewed as an
additional instrument of the government's redistribution policy like the choice of the income tax








-  fig. 3: Considering Household Preferences
It is clear that permits which are sold in the TEP market lead to emissions in the same amount
while the quantity e
h withheld by household h leads to a cutback of the overall emissions and,
therefore, reduces the overall emission target E  set by the government. This means that
households have the power to tighten the government's emission restriction E  by hoarding
emission permits so that actual overall emissions E
H as enforced by the households turn out to
be
(9) E ) e e ( E
H
1 h
h h H £ - = ￿
=
  .- 10 -
This implies that with such a TEP system the property right to nature is reallocated to the
households - at least to the extent of the overall emission limit E . Households have the
possibility to withhold a part or all of the distributed TEPs instead of selling them and, thereby,
reduce the actual emissions according to their personal preferences. Such a system would
involve households at least partially in the social abatement decision process instead of
excluding them as in the traditional system. The main features of this kind of TEP system are
illustrated in figure 3.
Another important advantage of admitting households as traders in the TEP market where they
can sell or buy permits is that this increases the number of agents in the permit market
considerably as compared to the traditional TEP regime so that the possibilities for strategic
manipulations of the market are significantly reduced. Therefore, returning the property right
to the environment to its "natural" owners, i. e. the citizens, is not only justified on moral or
ethical grounds but also avoids the economic drawbacks of the traditional TEP systems due to
"thin markets" which are typical for the existing emission trading systems. In this sense the
involvement of households in the emission trade implies also an improvement of market
efficiency.
4. Psychological considerations: incentives to withhold TEPs
The question arises why households should hoard emission permits instead of selling them and
buying consumption goods instead. To answer this question it is helpful to get a proper idea of
the household's decision problem. For this purpose let us first specify the household budget
constraint. We assume that private households own the primary resources of the economy.
They can be used as inputs in production and at least some of them can also be consumed
directly by the households (like e. g. time or land). We assume that each household h is
endowed with a stock y
h ˛ ￿+
M  of these resources which it can either consume or sell in the
respective market.10 The receipts from the sale of resources is one of the two sources of
household income. The other source is the sale of emission permits out of the stock e
h that
the household obtains from government.
From this income household h has to finance its market consumption (which is denoted by the
vector x
h ˛￿+
N ) at market prices p ˛ 
N
+ + ￿ , so that its consumption expenditures are
restricted by the budget constraint
(10) ( ) ( )
h h
e
h h h e e p y y q px - + - £  (h = 1,2, ..., H)   ,
where q ˛ 
M
+ + ￿  is the vector of factor prices and pe denotes the price of the emission
permits.11 The term  ( )
h h y y q -  comprises a household's conventional factor income while
                                               
10 By ￿+
M  we denote the non-negative orthant of the M-dimensional Euclidian space. Analogously, 
M
+ + ￿ is
the positive orthant of the M-dimensional Euclidian space.
11 It should be clear that not each household is necessarily endowed with each kind of primary factor, i. e.
some of the elements of the vector y
h can be zero.- 11 -
( )
h h
e e e p -  equals its income from the sale of the production factor "environment". Of





m y y >  for some m ˛ {1, 2, ..., M}), and the same is true for the TEPs, but the sum
on the right hand side of (10) must always be nonnegative. This means that households can act
as buyers and as sellers of primary resources and TEPs.
Preferences
If we want to go more deeply into a household's potential motivation to retain at least some
part of the TEPs e
h instead of selling them all we have to form a more detailed idea of its
preferences. It is assumed that a household h obtains satisfaction from its market consumption
x
h and from its consumption y
h of primary resources which could otherwise be sold in the
market. Additionally, a household may derive utility from environmental quality which we shall
denote by z and which is the same for all households since it is a pure public good.
The influence of z on household utility depends on what kind of pollutant is meant by z. If we
are talking about air or water quality or natural amenities this influence might be rather
important. In the case of greenhouse gas emissions like carbon dioxide, methane, nitrogen
oxide or CFCs a close relationship to utility is not very plausible since people do not sense
changes in the concentration of such gases directly. At best they read about it in the papers or
they are informed otherwise by the media. All the more it is amazing that in spite of the
impossibility of personal perception of greenhouse gases, in many countries people are ready
or even eager to make personal sacrifices for the sake of greenhouse gas reductions. They call
for CO2 taxes or for the introduction of TEP systems which both result in higher commodity
prices and, with incomes being constant, in reduced market consumption.
One possible explanation why people are willing to make sacrifices for environmental
improvements which they personally do not even perceive might be the existence of what
Andreoni (1989 and 1990) calls "impure altruism". In the context of greenhouse gas abatement
this means the possibility that people do not really care for the state of the atmosphere but they
feel a "warm glow" when they think they are doing "something good" or charitable. By
sacrificing private income or consumption for CO2 abatement they derive (a basically egoistic
form of) utility from the good deed itself and not from its consequences for something so
abstract as the future world climate. In our model people can engender this warm glow feeling
by retaining a part of their initial endowment e
h of TEPs because hoarding TEPs means
reducing greenhouse gas emissions by foregoing market consumption.
The existence of impure altruism seems to be a convincing explanation for the empirically
observable desire of many people to give up certain present utility from private market
consumption for uncertain future utility from the possible prevention of prospective climate
deterioration. True intergenerational altruism, of course, would be another explanation. But
from the true altruism point of view the world climate is a pure public good which raises all the
questions and imponderables known from the "private provision of a public good" debate. This
refers especially to the question of free riding, because for the world climate it does not matter
who does the good deed of reducing CO2 emissions. Therefore, pure altruism does not seem to
be a convincing explanation for the empirically observable desire of people to sacrifice private
consumption for climate improvements that benefit future generations.- 12 -
Considering impure altruism in our model means that hoarding TEPs has a double effect on
household utility: an indirect effect which is brought about by the consequences of reducing
emissions for environmental quality and a direct effect which arises from the act of hoarding
itself. This means that a household h receives utility from three different sources: from its
consumption of the market goods x
h, from the retained part y
h of its initial endowment of
primary resources y
h, and from its withheld TEPs e
h. Integrating these different effects into the























i h h h h e , e z , y , x u U (h = 1,2, ..., H)
where U
h is the utility level attained by household h and u
h(...) is the utility function.
Environmental quality z, which is the same for all households, depends on the sum of the
retained TEPs over all households (including household h), since each retained TEP means one
ton less of e. g. CO2 and, therewith, an improvement of environmental quality.
We see that the number e
h of TEPs hoarded by household h enters the utility function in two
ways: first, indirectly by influencing environmental quality and, second, directly by generating a
"warm glow of giving". The first effect, which could be described as the pure public good
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The second effect, which could be called the warm glow effect of hoarding TEPs, equals the
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From this maximization problem we obtain the standard optimality conditions for the
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where l
h* is the marginal utility of income in household equilibrium and (*) denotes the
equilibrium values of the arguments of the respective function, in this case of the utility
function. To specify the form of the optimality conditions for the TEP demand we must
distinguish between different assumptions with respect to household preferences.
The general case
If we take into account that a household receives utility from environmental quality z as well as
from its personal stock of hoarded TEPs e
h, where it can choose only e
h directly, the


























We observe that the first term on the left-hand side equals the public good effect (12) of
hoarding TEPs while the second term is the warm glow effect (13). Since both effects are non-
negative they both influence the demand for TEPs in the same direction.
To illustrate the relation between these two effects we make use of a simple diagram. If we
combine (16) with the market demand condition (15a) we obtain the marginal rate of

































In figure 4 we have the indifference curves for two versions of the household utility function:
UPG stands for the case where only the public good effect is considered (i. e. ¶u
h / ¶e
h = 0) and
UWG is the indifference curve according to (17) where also the warm glow effect is allowed
for. From (17) it is apparent that the indifference curves become steeper when the warm glow
effect is included in the analysis. This confirms the supposition that the pure public good effect
is reinforced by the warm glow effect, i. e. the warm glow effect leads to an increased demand
for TEPs (from 
h
PG e  to 
h
WG e in figure 4).12
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glow warm
-  fig. 4  -
Figure 5 illustrates the case where the pure public good effect is smaller than the TEP price (in
utility units) for all positive values of e
h. In this case the budget line is steeper than the
indifference curve for the utility function without warm glow so that the household does not
buy any TEPs for environmental reasons alone ( 0 e
h
PG = ). If there is a positive demand for
TEPs at all it arises only from the household's desire for warm glow ( 0 e
h
WG > ). Otherwise




















-  fig. 5  -- 15 -
These considerations confirm that the demand for TEPs can be separated into two independent
effects, i. e. the public good effect and the warm glow effect. Each of these two effects stands
for a different motivation of a household to hoard TEPs instead of selling them. In the
following subsection we shall have a closer look at each of these effects separately by
considering two special cases of a preference ordering. Let us start with the pure public good
case where no warm glow effect exists.
The pure public good case
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We see that the magnitude of the public good effect depends on the marginal utility of
environmental quality ¶u
h / ¶z on the one hand and the household's judgement of its own
influence on environmental quality ¶z / ¶e
h on the other.
(i) Indifference with respect to environmental quality
As explained before, in the case of greenhouse gases like CO2, methane etc. it is rather unlikely
that a household's utility is directly affected by the concentration of these gases, so that low
values of ¶u
h / ¶z whenever z denotes this kind of emissions which are typically regulated by








the left hand side of (19) is equal to zero and (19) is not fulfilled as an equation since the
marginal utility of income as well as the TEP price are strictly positive. The respective Kuhn-























so that the demand for TEPs e
h must be zero in this case because of the corresponding
complementary slackness condition- 16 -























The economic explanation of this result is rather straightforward: if you do not care for the
world climate and you do not bother about good deeds either, you have no incentive to buy
TEPs instead of market consumption goods. Such an indifference with respect to
environmental quality is not implausible if greenhouse gases like CO2 are concerned.
(ii) The tragedy of the commons
An analogous argument holds if a household appreciates an improvement of environmental
quality (i. e. ¶u
h / ¶z > 0) but thinks that its own possibilities to contribute to such an
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Such a combination of a positive marginal utility of environmental quality on the one hand and
a personal impact factor ¶z / ¶e
h of zero is typical for what is usually called the "tragedy of the
commons":13 the contradiction between social rationality on the one hand, which demands a
preservation of the public good "environment", and individual rationality, which tells the
individual that it is not worthwhile for him personally to make any sacrifices for the provision
of this public good, on the other. This kind of argument makes sense, especially, with respect
to the greenhouse effect since a single citizen's influence on the world climate is so small that
the benefits he receives from his personal contribution (e. g. by hoarding TEPs) can be
neglected. In such a case it seems reasonable from an individual point of view not to hoard any
TEPs. This consideration is confirmed by condition (21) which implies that the demand for
TEPs must zero under these circumstances.
(iii) Free riding
It is, of course, also possible that the marginal utility of environmental quality and the personal
impact factor are both positive and the demand for TEPs is all the same zero. This is the typical
"free riding" case, where an individual appreciates environmental quality (¶u
h / ¶z > 0) and is
well aware that he could do something about it (¶z / ¶e
h > 0) but, nevertheless, does not
contribute to the provision of the public good "environmental quality" (i. e. e
h = 0) because he
hopes that others will do it and he can consume the improved environmental quality for free.
Such a household will not buy any TEPs for purely strategic reasons.
For the pure public good case in which no warm glow is desired we have described three
special kinds of preference orderings which might induce a household to sell its whole stock of
TEPs: indifference with respect to environmental quality, the "tragedy of the commons"-case,
and the "free riding" case. If all households of an economy have one of these exceptional
preference orderings the overall emission limit E  set by the government is not changed
                                               
13 This concept was introduced into the literature by Hardin (1968).- 17 -
through the households' involvement in the TEP market: In this case a TEP system with
household participation leads to the same TEP allocation as auctioning or grandfathering. But
even in such a situation where all households refuse to play an active part in the regulation of
greenhouse gas emissions there is no negative impact on the level of climate preservation as
compared to the traditional TEP systems.
The pure warm glow case
As explained above the most convincing explanation for people's willingness to make personal
sacrifices for some good cause that does not benefit them directly is the existence of impure
altruism, i. e. the pleasure derived from the knowledge that one is doing something good. The
desire for this "warm glow of giving", as Andreoni (1990) called it, provides a sensible reason
for people to withhold some of the TEPs allotted to them instead of selling them to buy market
goods. For impure altruists the actual effect of their hoarding TEPs on world climate does not
matter. They are only interested in the feeling of being good citizens who have done their bit
for the good cause, while the cause itself is completely irrelevant. This motivation, of course,
eliminates the public good character of TEPs since the good citizen can get the desired warm
glow feeling only if he retains some TEPs himself, delegation is not possible. Consequently, in














there is no incentive for free riding because one cannot derive a warm glow from the charity of
others. In this case TEPs can be treated like ordinary market goods which are bought in












In fig. 6 the pure warm glow case where (22) holds is illustrated in analogy to figure 5. The
indifference curve UPG for a preference ordering without impure altruism is a straight line
parallel to the e
h-axis because hoarding TEPs generates no utility at all in this case. An impure
altruistic citizen on the other hand with indifference curves UWG can increase his utility from
h
WG U  to 
* h
WG U  if he is given the opportunity of hoarding some TEPs as can also be seen from




















-  fig. 6  -
In table 1 the different special cases from above are summarized. We see that, if we disregard
the warm glow argument (i. e. ¶ u
h / ¶ e
h = 0), there are three main reasons why a household
might sell all of its initial endowment e
h. One is indifference with respect to the pollutant in
question. This possibility, which is shown in the first line of table 1, can certainly not be ruled
out whenever we talk about greenhouse gases because these gases and the consequences of
their discharge into the environment cannot be sensed directly by human beings. These
consequences appear quite abstract and theoretical to many people, they are rather uncertain,
and they lie far in the future. Therefore, many people do not really bother for greenhouse gas
emissions.
The second reason not to hoard TEPs for purely environmental reasons is that many people
feel that they as individuals have no or nearly no influence on a global environmental problem
like the greenhouse effect (¶ z / ¶ e
h = 0). Therefore, they think it is not worthwhile to retain
any of their TEPs because the resulting effect on environment will be irrelevant, anyway (cf.
line 2 of table 1). Even if people do care for the greenhouse effect and if they believe that their
personal sacrifice makes sense with respect to the greenhouse problem there are still strong
incentives for an individual not to hoard TEPs because they regard the world climate as a pure
public good (which is correct if we disregard impure altruism). This means that people cannot
be excluded from its consumption even if they do not contribute to its provision and also the
quality of their consumption is not affected by their personal contribution. Therefore, any
personal contribution to the provision of that good (i. e. any retained emission permit) would
appear to them as a waste of income and private consumption (line 3 in table 1).
In spite of all these reasons for non-cooperative behavior with respect to the provision of the
public good "world climate" it can be observed that many people are willing and even keen to
make personal sacrifices (in terms of income or time) to prevent a deterioration of the world
climate. This fact might be interpreted as an empirical evidence for the hypothesis that people
do not behave as rational and egoistic as household theory would suggest. On the other hand it- 19 -
would be surprising if so many households acted out of mere irrationality. This consideration
suggests that there exist other rational incentives to contribute to the preservation of the
environment. A rather plausible motivation might be Andreoni's impure altruism as shown in
line 4 of table 1. Applied to our problem impure altruism can produce a positive household
demand for TEPs even in a society of free riders or a society that does not believe in the sense
of individual contributions to a better environment.


















0 ‡ 0 0 0
tragedy of the
commons
> 0 0 0 0
free riding > 0 > 0 0 0
pure warm glow case 0 ‡ 0 > 0 > 0
-  table 1  -
A note on pure altruism
After this detailed discussion of impure altruism as an incentive for hoarding TEPs one might
ask why pure altruism is not considered here with comparable scrutiny. The reason is that pure
altruism would not change our argumentation as compared to the pure public good case. In
principle, there are two main kinds of altruism treated in the economics literature: paternalistic
altruism and individualistic altruism.14
If we consider paternalistic altruism where the present generation cares for the future climate z





















i h h h h e z , y , x u U   .
This is the typical utility function for the pure public good case treated above. The household
cares for the future climate z but it does not matter who contributes to its improvement.
Therefore, the tragedy of the commons problem as well as the free riding discussion from
above apply here analogously.
                                               
14 For this distinction see e. g. Madariaga / McConnell (1987).- 20 -
If, alternatively, we deal with individualistic altruism where people today care for the utility v(￿)
of future generations and take into account the dependence of future utility on future climate





























i h h h h e z v , y , x u U   .
As in the paternalistic case we end up here with the typical public good problems of free riding
and the tragedy of the commons. Therefore, in spite of the fact that true altruism might provide
a compelling argument for the hoarding of TEPs at first sight it turns out that the typical public
good arguments against individual cooperation hold here so that the existence of purely
altruistic preferences does not change our previous discussion. The most convincing incentives
for the hoarding of TEPs by individual households result from the existence of impure altruism
and the desire for Andreoni's warm glow.
5. Efficiency considerations
In the last section we showed how a TEP system that involves households as participants in the
permit market might work. It became apparent that there are incentives for households to
retain at least some of the TEPs allocated to them. Therefore, we can expect that the TEP
allocation resulting from such a system will differ from the allocation that results from the
traditional emission trading mechanism because a smaller number of TEPs will be available for
polluters (both allocations may coincide only if all TEPs are sold to the firms). In order to test
the social desirability of such a change we have to scrutinize the efficiency properties of our
new TEP  system and to compare them to the respective properties of the traditional TEP
systems. In the following subsections we shall deal in turn with ecological efficiency, cost
efficiency and Pareto efficiency.
The TEP system with household participation as proposed here differs in two ways from the
traditional TEP systems. First and most important, households are allowed to withhold some
TEPs from the polluters and even to buy TEPs in addition to their initial endowment which
gives them the possibility to influence the total quantity of emissions. Second, the initial
endowment of TEPs is allocated to households (instead of firms or government) for free which
symbolizes that the property right to the environment is given to the households. This second
characteristic of our TEP system has the same impact on household consumption and
household utility as a lump-sum transfer, i. e. a mere income effect. For the efficiency
comparison to be made in this section the differences in income effects are irrelevant and
should be eliminated. For that purpose we assume for the following analysis that in all three
cases of TEP systems (grandfathering, auctioning, household participation) the returns from
the sale of the TEPs are transformed as lump-sum transfers to the household sector (according
to the same distribution scheme).- 21 -
Ecological efficiency
By the ecological efficiency of an environmental policy instrument we mean its capacity to
realize a given ecological target, in our case an emission target. From the environmental
economics literature we know that the ecological efficiency of the traditional emission trading
systems, i. e. of auctioning and grandfathering, is very high15 since the emission limit E as set
by the government cannot be transgressed by polluters (at least not legally). This is an
important difference between emission trading and e. g. the use of eco-taxes. The ecological
difference between auctioning and grandfathering on the one hand and our allocation system
where households obtain the TEPs on the other is that the overall emission limit E  as set by
the government can be tightened by households through hoarding TEPs so that E
H £ E
according to (9). Therefore, the modification of the emission trade as proposed in this paper
does not jeopardize the ecological objectives of the government represented by E  since this
emission limit can never be transgressed. The possibilities of the private households to interfere
with the government's environmental policy by enforcing their own emission target E
H are
restricted to the interval
(24) 0  £  E
H  £  E   .
In the ecological "worst case" when all households act as free riders and no one cares for a
warm glow total household demand for TEPs becomes zero. But even then the overall





h e   =  0      ￿     E
H  =  E   .
This shows that even if the most pessimistic critics of citizen participation in environmental
protection are right and there is no desire for warm glow and only free riding instead, the
quantity of emissions generated by the TEP system with household participation is not larger
than in the traditional auctioning or grandfathering case.
Also the other extreme case of preferences in which households are not willing to sell any of
their TEPs to polluters does not harm the ecological objectives of government. On the









h e       ￿     E
H  =  0
holds, emissions are reduced to zero. This situation could be explained with an extreme desire
for warm glow or with an extreme craving for an intact environment in combination with the
complete absence of free riding or tragedy-of-the-commons pessimism or – outside our model
and outside neo-classical household theory – with a lexicographic preference ordering, where
the environmental protection is first priority. A reduction of total emissions to zero might, of
course, be harmful to the production sector but it is not harmful to the environment and if
households have such an extraordinary preference for climate protection this must be
respected.
                                               
15  Cf. e. g.Klaasen / Försund (1994).- 22 -
In reality one probably has to deal with mixed preferences, i. e. with some free riders, some
pure altruists, some environmentally ignorant households and some impure altruists. In such a
typical situation some of the TEPs distributed to the households will be retained and some will
be sold to polluters so that the effective emission level E
H will lie somewhere between 0 and
E . But no matter if one of the extreme cases described above or the mixed preferences case
comes into effect the emission limit E  will always be respected so that the ecological
efficiency of a TEP system with household participation is always guaranteed. Comparing (24)
to (3) or (6) we see that with respect to ecological efficiency a TEP system with household
participation is at least as good as the traditional TEP systems but probably - in all cases but
the special case (25) – it is better.
Cost efficiency
It is common knowledge that emission trading is an instrument of "high economic efficiency".
What is meant here is the fact that tradable emission permits of the auctioning or
grandfathering type do not discriminate between different uses of one and the same production
factor, i. e. the marginal product of an input is the same in all its different uses. In this regard a
TEP system has the same impact on the firm's production decision as a uniform per-unit tax on
emissions. As was shown e. g. by Baumol and Oates (1971) in their seminal paper on the
pricing and standards approach this condition is necessary for the realization of a given
environmental target with minimal social costs.
The TEP system with household participation as proposed in this paper has the same economic
impact on the firms' profit maximization conditions as TEP systems with government
auctioning or grandfathering: firms hire inputs y and e until optimality conditions (4) and (5)
are fulfilled. Together with technical efficiency and well-behaved production functions this
ensures cost efficiency in the sense of Baumol and Oates. Therefore, regarding cost efficiency
the TEP system with household participation proposed in this paper is equivalent to the
traditional TEP systems.
Pareto efficiency
As a preliminary result we can state that a TEP system with household participation is
equivalent to the traditional TEP systems with respect to (social) cost efficiency and at least as
good (but probably better ) with respect to ecological efficiency. In this subsection we want to
include household utility into our efficiency considerations which leads us to the problem of
Pareto efficiency. To illustrate our considerations we use a simplified model with only two
households and one aggregated production sector.
The Pareto conditions






















i h h h h e , e z , y , x u U   (h = 1,2)- 23 -
This utility function implies the option that one or both households are impure altruists. The
production possibilities of our economy are given by the implicit production function
(27) ( )
U U e , y , x F   £  0
where the emissions e
U represent  the use of the environment as an input, i. e. as a sink for the
emissions of the production sector. The emissions are treated analogously to the conventional
market inputs y
U for the production of the output vector x.
We further assume that government sets an emission limit E  which must not be exceeded.
Households and firms have to share this emission quota according to
(28) e
1  +  e
2  +  e
U   £   E
where households "consume" emissions e
h (h = 1, 2) by preventing them. I. e. the quota E  can
be used by firms (for production) or by households (to save the world climate or to generate a
warm glow).
Accordingly the total quantities of primary resources Y ˛ ￿+
M  have to be distributed on
households for consumption on the one hand and to the production sector as inputs on the
other
(29) y
1  +  y
2  +  y
U   £   Y  .
From this simple model we obtain the standard Pareto conditions with respect to the optimal
































      (n  =  1, 2, ..., N; m  =  1, 2, ..., M)
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where m* is the conversion factor of utility of household 1 into utility of household 2, i. e.16
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From the solution of our optimization problem we further obtain the conditions for efficient
production (inequality (27) must be fulfilled as an equation in a Pareto optimum), for
ecological efficiency according to (28), for an efficient use of the primary resources (inequality
(29) must be fulfilled as an equation) and for cost efficiency (from the derivatives of the
Lagrangean in FN 15 for e
U and 
U
m y ). In the following subsection we shall check to what
extent these conditions for Pareto optimality are fulfilled by a TEP system with household
participation as proposed in section 3.
Efficiency characteristics of a TEP system with household participation
In the preceding subsections we showed that a TEP system with household participation fulfills
the Pareto conditions of ecological efficiency and cost efficiency while an efficient allocation of
market commodities x and y according to (29) and (30) is guaranteed by well-behaved utility
and production functions and the existence of competitive markets. The only remaining
problem is the Pareto optimal allocation of emissions according to (31).
From (31) it becomes obvious that household preferences should not be neglected whenever
emission reductions are at stake unless in the exceptional case where no household cares either
for environmental quality or for warm glow feelings. An optimal allocation of emissions,
however, would require that no household acts as a free rider and no one is discouraged by the
supposed insignificance of his possible contribution to a cutback of global emissions (i. e. there
is no tragedy of the commons). Further, each household must bear in mind the external effects
which its personal contribution to emission reduction by hoarding TEPs exerts on the utility of
other households (according to the third term on the left-hand side and the first term on the
right-hand side of (31)). Clearly, it would be naive to assume that these conditions are
absolutely fulfilled in reality. But it would also be naive to believe that these effects are as
irrelevant as economic theory would suggest. In experimental studies it was shown that
households act much less rational in reality than in theory so that e. g. the free riding problem
is much less important in reality than it should be expected on theoretical grounds.17
Irrespective of these public good problems it is apparent from (31) that also the potential
existence of impure altruism calls for an explicit consideration of household preferences with
respect to an emission reduction. Households and firms are competing for emissions where
firms want to discharge and households want to prevent emissions. The resulting distribution
problem can be managed in a market system by implementing a TEP system with household
participation as described in section 3. Each TEP stands e. g. for one ton of CO2 emissions. If
the TEP is bought by a firm this means one more ton of CO2 emissions, if it is retained by a
household this implies a reduction of total CO2 emissions by one ton (as compared to E ) and
it might give rise to warm glow.
                                                                                                                                                  
( ) ( ) ( )
U U U 2 1 U 2 1 e , y , x F y y y Y e e e E ￿ n - - - - ￿ b - - - - ￿ a   .
17 Cf. e. g. the "classical" study of Bohm (1972), Schneider / Pommerehne (1981), Andreoni (1995) or
Cummings / Harrison / Rutström (1995).- 25 -
If no household cares for future climate z (so that ¶u
h / ¶z = 0, " h) only the warm glow



























Comparing (33) to condition (30) confirms our former remark that in the pure warm glow case
emissions can be viewed as market commodities, since the same optimality conditions hold for
them. A household can obtain a warm glow only by its own contributions to emission
reduction, i. e. by its own hoarding of TEPs, free riding is not possible.
From these considerations it becomes clear that even if the pessimists with respect to free
riding and the tragedy of the commons are right there remains still an important argument for
involving households in emission trading as long as the existence of impurely altruistic
preferences can be assumed. In this case emissions can be viewed as market commodities. If
they are also traded like market commodities, i. e. as TEPs in a respective market with
household participation, it is even possible to realize a Pareto optimum according to the
adjusted Pareto condition (33). Only if households care neither for the world climate nor for
warm glow feelings a total neglect of household preferences with respect to emission can yield
a Pareto optimum, too, since in this case optimality conditions (32) or (33) vanish completely.
But if households do not care at all for CO2 emissions there is no reason for an emission
reduction policy in an anthropocentric world.
Figures 4 to 6 illustrate that under our assumptions with respect to the use of the revenues
from the TEP sales, especially, in the pure warm glow case a switch of environmental policy
from auctioning or grandfathering to a TEP system with household participation will lead to an
increase in the utility level of impurely altruistic households, while the utility of all other
households (for which ¶u
h / ¶z = 0 and/or ¶z / ¶e
h = 0) remains unchanged. This confirms that
in this case such a policy change may lead to a Pareto superior situation for the economy under
consideration.
It should be mentioned at this point that, of course, the same efficiency properties could also
be attained by a TEP system where the TEPs are initially allocated to the public sector or the
private production sector as long as households are enabled to participate in the TEP trade,
i. e. as long they may buy and withdraw some of the TEPs from the quota available to
polluters. The main reason to allocate the total TEP endowment initially to the household
sector is an ethical one: such an allocation makes allowance for the fact that the natural
environment should be part of the wealth of private households and that the property right to
the environment should, therefore, be allocated to them.
6. Concluding remarks
The main disadvantage of traditional models of tradable emission permit regimes is that
households have no possibilities to influence the determination of emission limits. These limits
are fixed by governments as a result of a political process from which citizens usually are
excluded. This is especially true for countries where there is no constitutional right to hold- 26 -
referenda with respect to single policy issues. Emission targets are often fixed as the result of
international negotiations between the governments of several countries or groups of countries
as was the case e. g. at the Climate Change Summit in Kyoto in 1997. Within the framework of
a TEP system as proposed here the national population of a country would have the possibility
to improve on the results of such international negotiations even after the national emission
targets have been fixed. Of course, as was shown above, this influence of citizens after the
determination of an "official" emission target is restrained to a reduction of the respective
target values while a relaxation is not feasible.
Nevertheless, the good news is that under a TEP regime as proposed here households are able
to exert some influence on environmental policy. This seems to be an important improvement
in comparison to the traditional TEP models. It was demonstrated that a TEP system with
household participation has the same cost efficiency properties as traditional TEP systems and
that its ecological efficiency is in most cases higher (whenever at least some of the TEPs are
withheld by households). It could even be shown that under fairly realistic assumptions (impure
altruism instead of "true" preferences for the global CO2 emissions level) a switch from
traditional TEP systems to emissions trading with household participation might lead to a
Pareto improvement and even to a Pareto optimum.
It was also emphasized that, apart from such efficiency deliberations, there are important
ethical reasons for a household participation in the fixing of emission limits. A TEP system as
proposed here would imply a reallocation of the property right to nature to where it belongs,
i. e. to the private households. This conforms with the early ideas of economic freedom and the
principles of consumer sovereignty. These ethical considerations are the main reason for our
proposition to allocate the total TEP endowment of the economy initially to the household
sector. The efficiency properties of our TEP system could, however, also be attained by a TEP
system where the initial endowment is allocated to the public sector or to the firms as long as
households have the possibility to buy TEPs in order to reduce the global emissions level.
The fact that households actually have to pay for the environmental improvements they
demand makes such a modified TEP system superior to the determination of emission limits by
opinion polls or non-committal referenda. The decision to sacrifice some part of one's personal
consumption for an environmental improvement is much more serious than the statement of a
more or less arbitrary number in an opinion poll, which has no personal consequences at all.
The typical validity and reliability problems which are well-known e. g. from contingent
valuation surveys with respect to environmental improvements do not occur with a TEP
system as proposed here: The determination of pollution limits by means of such a TEP system
seems, therefore, to be much more reliable than by hypothetical valuation surveys or opinion
polls. In this context it does not matter if the true motive for the storing decision is real
concern for the environment or the longing for a "warm glow".
Last but not least, it should be mentioned that the initial distribution of emission permits to
households can, of course, be used as an instrument of redistribution policy, i. e. as a means to
improve distributional justice. The elaboration of a satisfactory method for the initial allocation
of the emission permits is definitely one of the most important and most difficult tasks for the
practical implementation of such a TEP regime.- 27 -
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